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With How the body shapes the mind, Shaun Gallagher provides a general panoptic of the 
importance of the body in cognition, partly based on a series of articles published in the 
last ten years. Gallagher summarizes significant experimental results coming from a wide 
variety of domains: neuropsychology (e.g. deafferentation, aplasic phantom limbs, and 
schizophrenia), neuroscience (e.g. mirror neurons), developmental psychology (e.g. 
neonate imitation) and social psychology (e.g. communicative gestures). He uses these 
results to develop a theory of embodied cognition. His main goals here are (1) to describe 
body awareness in detail and (2) to investigate the influence of the body on self-
consciousness, perception, language and social cognition. In the first part of the book, 
Gallagher emphasizes the need to distinguish between two kinds of systems for the body, 
the body image and the body schema. These systems have been often confused in the 
literature. In the second part, he tries to show that these body systems structure the way 
we perceive the world and the way we perceive other people. How the body shapes the 
mind is a very rich book that raises a lot of interesting questions. However, I will not be 
able to cover all of them and I will focus on two points: the nature of the body schema 
and the structuring role of the body. 
What it is like to have a body 
Do we have one single kind of system for representing the body? It does not seem so. The 
body can be viewed from many different perspectives (e.g. semantic, emotional, spatial, 
motor, tactile, visual, proprioceptive, etc.) and described in terms of many pairs of 
opposing properties (e.g. conscious/unconscious, conceptual/non conceptual, 
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dynamic/static, innate/acquired). This diversity has led to a widespread confusion about 
body representations, as noticed by Gallagher. In order to clarify the conceptual 
landscape of the study of the body, Gallagher provides a distinction between body 
schema and body image that cuts across all the previous distinctions. “A body image 
consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own body. In 
contrast, a body schema is a system of sensory-motor capacities that function without 
awareness or the necessity of perceptual monitoring.” (p. 24). According to Gallagher, 
this distinction finds empirical ground in a double dissociation in neurology. Patients with 
personal neglect do not attend to the left part of their body. For instance, they shave or 
make up only the right side of their face. This would result from a disruption of their 
perceptual body image. Conversely, deafferented patients, who receive no tactile or 
proprioceptive information below the neck, are unable to move if they do not observe 
carefully what they are doing. Their body schema is severely impaired, replaced by a 
reflexive body image. We can summarize the main properties of the body schema and the 
body image as follow: 
 
Body image Body schema 
Available to consciousness, even if only at the 
margin 
Non-conscious 
Personal level Sub-personal level 
Sense of ownership (my body) Anonymous 
Abstract and partial Coherent and holistic 
Distinguished from the environment In interaction with the environment 
Not involved in action, except in some cases Involved in action 
Deficits in personal neglect Deficits in deafferentation 
 
Despite their differences, the body image and the body schema share some common 
features. First, they are both multimodal. Gallagher underlines the importance of the 
interaction between vision, proprioception and touch in chapter three. The integration 
between interoception and exteroception plays an important role both for constructing the 
sense of ownership of one’s own body and for imitating the movements of other bodies. 
Second, body image and body schema are both partly innate, as indicated by the 
existence of phantom limbs in the congenital absence of limbs (ch. 4). Gallagher 
acknowledges the difficulty in interpreting aplasic phantom limbs, which could involve 
either an innate structural body image or innate hand-mouth coordination schemata.  
Gallagher has played an important role in clarifying the literature about the body 
with his distinction between the body image and the body schema. The distinction is 
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mainly functional: the body schema is for action and the body image is for everything 
that is not action. However, further clarification can be achieved by disentangling the 
different components of each system. Indeed, each of the body systems is highly 
heterogeneous.  
According to Gallagher, the body image includes body percept, body concept and 
body affect. But why does he group all these in a single category? While the pragmatic 
function of the body schema is clear, the unitary function of the body image is far from 
obvious and it is not explicitly explained by Gallagher. This unifying criterion is all the 
more necessary because there is a competing line of thought that suggests that there are 
three kinds of body representation: sensori-motor (or body schema), visuo-spatial (or 
body surface) and semantic (or body image) (Head and Holmes, 1911; Sirigu et al., 1991, 
Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005). This distinction is founded on neuropsychological 
dissociations between spatial disorders of the body (such as autotopoagnosia) and 
semantic disorders of the body (such as body agnosia). There would be then not two but 
three body systems. However, this distinction leaves out the affective part of the body 
image. Does that mean that there would even be four kinds of body system? There may 
be a risk of an infinite multiplication of body representations, which would be pointless. 
The dual distinction as suggested by Gallagher remains a useful tool for designing 
experiments on the body. However, as long as Gallagher does not provide a systematic 
account of the function of the body image, he will not be able to argue for his view. 
The unity of the body schema is also problematic. The question this time does not 
so much concern the existence of a unifying function but the underlying abilities involved 
in a sensori-motor schema. One may first notice that Gallagher defines the body schema 
as a set of capabilities. I have some difficulties in understanding what these capabilities 
are and Gallagher does not provide any help on this topic. He remains very vague about 
the components of the body schema. According to his view, the body schema is not a 
representation of the body for action. However, it seems that we do need information 
about the state of our own body if we want to move. Furthermore, we may be mistaken 
about our bodily state, and such mistakes would have consequences for our actions. This 
argues in favor of the existence of pragmatic body representations for action. One 
example of such pragmatic body representations, which is mentioned by Gallagher 
himself, is the sensory feedback about one’s own body resulting from one’s own 
movements. However, this is far from being the only component of the body schema.  
Let’s go back to the example of deafferentation, which has been developed in 
detail by Gallagher (ch. 2). Gallagher describes mainly the single case of IW, a patient 
who following a neuropathy, has lost all proprioceptive and tactile information below the 
neck, but who is still able to move, walk, and behave almost as if nothing happened. 
However, his movements are no longer automatic and require him to carefully pay 
attention to all the details. His only source of information about his body is visual. When 
he cannot see his movements, he loses contact with his body and cannot monitor his 
movements. He does not even know where his body is or what the posture of his limbs is. 
Gallagher concludes that IW has lost his body schema, which has been imperfectly 
replaced by his body image. This conclusion may be too extreme. There is indeed a lack 
of internal sensory feedback in IW, which greatly impairs his ability to move. However, 
we cannot reduce the body schema solely to proprioceptive and tactile information. 
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Therefore, we cannot assume an almost complete loss of the body schema in 
deafferentation. There is more in the body schema and I would like now to analyze these 
further components.  
It is important to be explicit about what kind of information concerning the body 
that we need if we want to be able to move. In computational models of action (Wolpert, 
1997), there is rarely any mention of the body per se. However, pragmatic representations 
of the body play a role at almost every stage of processing, and not only at the level of the 
sensory feedback. I would like to suggest the existence of two levels of pragmatic 
representation of the body, based on a distinction made by Jacob and Jeannerod (2003). 
Following the tradition opened by Milner and Goodale (1995), Jacob and Jeannerod 
distinguish semantic and pragmatic visual representations of a given object. In the latter 
case, the object is viewed as the goal of an action performed by an agent. There are two 
kinds of properties of the goal that may be represented for action. First, there are the basic 
perceptual features of the object such as its shape or its size (first-order pragmatic 
representation). Second, there is the function of the object, how to use a tool for instance 
(higher-order pragmatic representation). I would like to suggest that similarly we can 
draw a distinction between a first-order body schema and a second-order body schema.  
The first-order body schema represents the perceptual features of one’s own body 
that are necessary to know if one wants to move. It includes the posture of the body 
before and after the movement. It also includes the bodily posture predicted by the 
forward model, which can be compared to the final bodily posture in order to check 
whether the movement has been successful. It also includes some personal bodily 
constraints. The motor system needs to take into account the size of one’s own limbs and 
their strength in order to program adequately the movement to perform. However, there is 
more in the body schema. One question remains open: how to use the body. The higher-
order body schema represents a functional map of the body. Performing an action 
requires one to program which body part and which muscles to use for this specific 
movement. It also requires taking into account the kinematic constraints of the body, like 
the degree of freedom of the joints. For instance, the best pathway between two bodily 
postures is not necessarily the shortest one, because it may be physically impossible.  
There are two further differences between these two kinds of body schema. First, 
one is a short-term representation, adjusting to each new posture, while the other is a 
long-term representation of the body. Second, the first-order body schema represents 
one’s own body, it is highly specific to the agent’s body. What is true of my bodily 
posture is not true of your bodily posture. In contrast, the higher-order body schema 
represents the human body in general, independently of whose body it is. What is true of 
my kinematic constraints is most of the time also true of your kinematic constraints. 
In deafferentation, only the first-order body schema would be impaired. However, 
I claim against Gallagher that there is a component of the body schema that is preserved, 
namely, the higher-order body schema. Deafferented patients do not know their posture if 
they close their eyes, but they still know the kinematic constraints of their body. The 
mirror phenomenon of deafferentation would be apraxia. People with apraxia no longer 
know how to use their body to execute actions, but they retain information about their 
bodily postures and the size of their limbs. Interestingly, people with aplasic phantom 
limb are sensitive to kinematic constraints (Funk, Shiffrar & Brugger, 2005). These 
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results suggest that they have at least a higher-order body schema. Whether this schema 
would be innate or not it is difficult to decide. Indeed, the higher-order body schema in 
aplasic individuals may derive from observation of other people’s bodily movements.  
To sum up, Gallagher’s effort toward clarification in the study of the body and its 
disorders has played a central role recently in the literature.  His distinction between the 
body schema and the body image provides a promising approach, which needs to be 
deepened in further details. With the help of his theory of the body, Gallagher is ready to 
develop a full-fleshed theory of embodied cognition.  
The structural role of the body 
Gallagher’s main goal in his book is to argue for a theory of embodied cognition. This 
trend has been recently promoted by several philosophers like Andy Clark (1997) and 
Alva Noë (2004) and by neuroscientists like Francesco Varela (1991) and Antonio 
Damasio (1994) among others. Their main hypothesis is that mind, body, and world 
mutually interact and influence one another to promote an organism’s adaptive success. 
The theory of embodied cognition can be considered as a reaction against the traditional 
computationalist view of the mind. The mind cannot be understood solely on the basis of 
logical rules of inner mental processes independently of the external environment. One 
must “put brain body and world together again” as Clark (1997) said. Gallagher does not 
argue against computationalism. Rather he argues against the Cartesian view of the mind, 
which gives absolute priority to the cogito, neglecting the role of the body. He intends to 
show that the embodiment of human beings simultaneously limits and prescribes the 
types of cognitive processes that are available to them. This influence is “prenoetic”, 
prior to any kind of knowledge, unavailable to introspective consciousness. The body is 
not part of the content of our experiences, still it influences their nature and their 
perspective. Gallagher claims that the body shapes the mind at a fundamental basic level, 
even if it remains “behind the scene” (p. 141).  
The specificity of Gallagher compared to other theorists of embodiment is that he 
provides first a theory of the body before explaining how the body shapes the mind. The 
chapter 6 is the key chapter, especially since it contains material that has not been 
published before. His main claim is that the way our body allows us to interact with the 
environment structures the way we perceive the self, the world and the others. Gallagher 
assumes that once one knows how the body schema shapes perception then one will 
know how it shapes the whole of cognition, as perception is the fundamental basis of 
cognition (p. 137). He focuses mainly on three domains: self-consciousness, 
intersubjectivity and language. He also briefly mentions a wide range of data that show 
the influence of the body. The relationship between the body and the cognitive domains is 
more or less strong. For instance, the sense of ownership and the sense of agency of one’s 
own thoughts are only indirectly structured by the body, through emotions. Nevertheless 
Gallagher argues that the Husserlian temporal structure of the stream of thoughts follows 
the same principles as actions, which can be considered as a model of understanding. I 
will not go into the detail of each of the domains. I will rather analyze the different 
notions of embodiment used by Gallagher. 
Surprisingly, Gallagher does not exploit his theory of the body in his theory of 
embodied cognition as fully as he could, and the links between the two parts of his work 
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are not always salient. More particularly, one may notice the diversity of body notions he 
refers to when talking about embodiment, which goes further than his distinction between 
the body schema and the body image. There are at least four implicit core notions of the 
body that he uses to describe how the body shapes the mind: (1) the organic body; (2) the 
spatial body, (3) the body schema and (4) the affective body.  
 
(1) The organic body: Gallagher refers sometimes to the organic anatomical body in 
what he calls a “Neo-Aristotelian Neurobiology”. For instance, he shows the 
importance of upright posture in developing new capabilities (p. 147-148). He also 
describes the influence of physiological autonomic functions on cognitive and 
behavioural performances (p. 149-150). Similarly, when he addresses the Molyneux 
question, his reply is based on the neurophysiology of the visual system. The 
congenital blind man who regains his sight will not be able to distinguish the 
objects as such because of neuronal deterioration in the visual cortex (ch. 7). 
(2) The spatial body: Gallagher also appeals to the idea of the body as a spatial 
anchor point. Human perception is encoded relatively to the location of the body in 
space. The external world is encoded in egocentric frames of reference, which can 
be eye-centred, head-centred or trunk-centred. The body provides a perspective on 
the world (p. 137-138). 
(3) The body schema: Based on his theory of the body schema developed in the first 
part, Gallagher emphasizes the role of the body schema in structuring our 
interactions with the world and with ourselves. He endorses an ecological view of 
perception like Gibson (1979). Objects are perceived by the opportunities they 
provide to act on them. The world is constituted of affordances for the body (p. 
141). Gallagher also endorses an ecological view of the self like Neisser (1988) (ch. 
8). I recognize myself when I am moving. The sense of agency derives from the 
integration between afferent and efferent signals. The sense of ownership of one’s 
own body derives from the comparison between proprioception and vision. Finally, 
Gallagher shows how the body schema can influence the body image (p. 144). 
(4) The affective body: Emotions are briefly mentioned in their role in pathological 
syndromes such as Capgras’ delusion, Cotard’s delusions, and delusions of control 
in schizophrenia (p. 151, 200-202). Emotions provide an affective tonality to our 
perceptual experiences and if this tonality is missing one may not be able to 
recognize perceptions for what they really are.  
To sum up, there is a wide diversity of embodiment. The body structures experiences at 
different levels. One may notice here that there is almost no mention of the influence of 
the body image on cognition. It may be because the body image is available to 
consciousness and therefore, its influence is no longer prenoetic.  
Gallagher’s emphasis on the wide range of cases of embodiment is important. 
However, the main conclusions, though interesting and worth some serious thought, 
could be better defended. One may regret that he does not seem to go beyond a mere 
descriptive list of cases of embodied cognition and leaves open the question of the unity 
of embodiment. Is there only one kind of embodiment or several kinds (which would be 
relative to the body notion he uses)? The book would have been even more interesting if 
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Gallagher had provided a unifying theoretical framework to understand how the body 
shapes the mind.  
Overall, Gallagher’s book is an interesting work for an interdisciplinary audience. 
He is one of the few philosophers to try to develop a real theory of the body. His 
conclusions are based on careful analysis of a vast amount of literature in neuroscience, 
psychology and neuropsychology, and he addresses several contemporary questions 
about the role of the body in cognition. Nonetheless, one may still ask at the end of the 
book: “What really shapes the mind? The body itself or the way we mentally represent 
the body?” In the latter case, it seems that we remain stuck inside the mind and we can 
wonder to what extent cognition is really embodied.  
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